Employment-related health coverage is the predominant form of health insurance in the nonelderly, US population. Developing sound policies regarding the tax treatment of employersponsored insurance requires detailed information on the insurance benefits offered by employers as well as detailed information on the characteristics of employees and their familes. Unfortunately, no nationally representative data set contains all of the necessary elements. This paper describes the development of the Employer-Sim model which models tax-based health policies by using data on workers from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component (MEPS HC) to form synthetic workforces for each establishment in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS IC). This paper describes the application of Employer-Sim to estimating tax subsidies to employer-sponsored health insurance and presents estimates of the cost and indcidence of the subsidy for 2008. The paper concludes by discussing other potential applications of the Employer-Sim model.
Introduction
Employment-related health coverage is the predominant form of health insurance in the nonelderly, US population covering 68.7% of adults and 58.4% of children for at least a part of the year in 2008. Current tax law provides strong subsidies to private employer-sponsored coverage as employer premium contributions and an increasing share of employee contributions are exempt from income and payroll taxes. Proposals to modify this subsidy are a perennial subject of policy debate due to their overall cost and concerns about both equity and efficiency: current subsidies primarily benefit higher income families who are the least likely to be uninsured or covered by public insurance 1 and may encourage higher than optimal levels of coverage and medical care consumption 2 .
In recent years, the erosion of employer-sponsored private health insurance 3 has led to considerable interest in a number of potential changes to the tax structure that would increase incentives for employers to offer health insurance and for individuals to purchase non-group private insurance coverage. Recently proposed changes in the tax treatment of health insurance benefits have included: capping or eliminating current subsidization of employer-sponsored insurance; providing refundable tax credits that cover all, or part, of the cost of insurance; allowing individuals to deduct insurance costs; and "pay or play" provisions that require employers to arrange for and contribute to employees' health insurance coverage (play) or pay some amount per employee to subsidize other insurance options (pay). 4 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that was signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010 changed the tax treatment of health insurance in a number of ways. Changes include tax credits for small employers (< 25 workers) that provide health insurance for employees and refundable premium tax credits for persons with family incomes between 133-400% of the Federal Poverty Line to purchase insurance through newly established exchanges. PPACA also imposes an excise tax on high cost plans, with risk-adjusted thresholds determining which plans are taxed, and assesses fees on large employers (50+ workers) whose employees receive premium tax credits through insurance exchanges.
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Evaluating the impact of proposed changes and developing sound policies regarding the tax treatment of employment-related insurance requires data on employer and employee premium contributions, as well as data to support marginal tax rate simulations including each worker's income by type from all sources. Estimating the incidence of changes in tax-related health policies requires detailed information on employers (e.g., location, industry, firm size) and information on employee characteristics (e.g., total family income, assets and health status) that is representative of each establishment's entire workforce. 6 Unfortunately, no single nationally representative data source contains all of these data elements, so researchers must combine information from multiple sources.
5 Kaiser Family Foundation (2011a) . 6 The MEPS HC has detailed individual-level data that includes information on employers. These data, however, do not have information on employer premium contributions. Furthermore, the fundamental problem with relying solely on the MEPS HC to build a micro-simulation model is that data on individuals does not provide information on the nature of co-workers. It is not possible, therefore, to compute concepts such as the average subsidy in a worker's firm (Gruber, 2010) or to evaluate models of establishment behavior (e.g., the median voter model). Each individual is, in effect, a randomly selected worker, so we cannot reliably infer that a given establishment is basing decisions on whether to offer insurance, or other similar decisions, on the observed worker's preferences.
Our model uses a relatively simple approach that combines data from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS IC) 7 and the MEPS Household
Component (HC). In essence, we use data on workers from the MEPS HC to form synthetic workforces for each establishment in the MEPS-IC. The MEPS IC is the pre-eminent source of nationally representative data on U.S. employers and the insurance coverage they offer to their employees. The MEPS IC provides some limited perspective on each establishment's workforce, but lacks detailed information about employees and their families. At the same time,
the MEPS HC provides a more comprehensive view of decision-making by workers and their families, but lacks detailed information regarding workers' establishments. To exploit the strengths of these two datasets, we refine the method developed in Selden and Gray (2006) for linking the MEPS-IC and HC data. The resulting "Employer-Sim" model provides a unique opportunity to model the dual individual/group decision-making process in establishments and to investigate a broad array of topics in the provision of employer sponsored private insurance. We believe that our method of linking the two data sets preserves, to the greatest extent possible, the correlations between establishments' and workers' characteristics and choices. Another strength of the MEPS-IC is that it contains several key pieces of information regarding workforce characteristics including the percentages of employees who are female, age 50 and over, members of unions, low wage, medium wage and high wage. 9 As is true with any employer survey, however, these workforce characteristics are not by themselves sufficient to form marginal tax rate estimates, nor do they provide information on family income, wealth, assets, health status and other worker and family characteristics that may be needed in policy or behavioral analyses. For these reasons, we supplement the MEPS-IC with data from the MEPS Household Component (MEPS-HC), in essence constructing synthetic workforces for each MEPS-IC establishment using household data on workers and their families. Cohen, et al. (1996) and S. Cohen (1997) .
MEPS
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This sample selection criterion matches the scope of workers included in the MEPS IC (personal communication with Jim Branscomb, AHRQ) and also matches the scope of workers who can be identified in the MEPS HC Person Round Plan files as holding employer-sponsored health insurance.
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A significant portion of MEPS HC employment variables for current main jobs had missing values that had not been previously imputed by AHRQ staff. We used HDCOLIMP software to impute missing values and imposed consistency and logical edits on imputed variables. Some employment variables (e.g., industry) are not recorded for current miscellaneous jobs. We imputed these characteristics from current main jobs using both person-level and job-level class variables. 13 Hay Group (2010).
14 We assumed that all Federal workers in the Transportation industry were postal employees. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) classifies the industry for Postal workers as transportation and the resulting number of Postal workers in the MEPS HC, an average annual total of about 1 million, is close to other available estimates. 15 For more information see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) . 16 Data on home ownership is obtained by linking the MEPS-HC to the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). 17 In estimating tax subsidies we adopt the widely-used assumption that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions through lower cash wages, with incidence in proportion to the employer's contribution to the employee's held plan. To construct marginal tax rates, therefore, we add the average employer contribution to the wages of workers with coverage, simulate the additional taxes owed, and then calculate an average marginal tax rate as the change in taxes divided by the average employer contribution. The process is the same for workers without coverage except that we subtract the average employer contribution from wages.
Constructing Synthetic Workforces
We construct synthetic workforces by statistically matching MEPS HC workers to MEPS IC establishments in a process that first uses establishment level characteristics to draw a sample of workers for each establishment, then uses information on worker characteristics to fine-tune the match. Appendix A lists the variables used in each of these steps.
Drawing Synthetic Workforces. In the first step of the matching process, we use establishment-level variables that are recorded on both the MEPS IC and MEPS HC. We use these variables to draw a sample of a minimum of 300 workers from the MEPS HC who match as nearly as possible the MEPS IC establishment on industry and size, whether the firm had multiple establishments and whether the establishment offered insurance to its employees.
MEPS HC workers are sampled with replacement so each worker may link to multiple establishments. Since wages are an important determinant of marginal tax rates and other worker characteristics of interest, we ensure that each sample of workers includes at least 100 low wage, 100 medium wage and 100 high wage workers. The matching process is conducted separately for private sector workers and for state and local government workers.
To match workers to establishments we use specialized matching software (HDCOLIMP) 18 that automatically creates cells, of a specified minimum size, constructed from establishment-level class variables to link donor records from the MEPS HC to recipient records in the MEPS IC. In HDCOLIMP, class variables are listed in order of priority and cells are automatically collapsed, as required for each establishment, to ensure a statistically adequate pool of workers to draw from. We prioritized the class variables by examining cell frequencies and by using the MEPS HC data to examine regressions of marginal tax rates on our class variables. To create the database that we used to estimate tax subsidies, below, we used the following ordering of class variables: offer of insurance, industry, Census Region, number of employees, multiple locations, Census Division. The class variables could be reorderd or respecified to optimize the match for other worker characteristics.
State-Specific Marginal Tax Rates. As noted in the previous section, we simulate state and federal marginal tax rates for each worker using state tax laws in effect in each state. After linking workers to an establishment, we select marginal tax rates for each worker to match the establishment's state. This allows us to conduct simulations of tax-based health policies that reflect taxes in each establishment's state, even though our matching procedure allows MEPS HC workers to be drawn from outside of the establishment's state.
Raking Weight Adjustment. Next, we implement a raking post-stratification of the MEPS-HC sampling weights within each establishment so that each establishment's synthetic workforce of MEPS-HC workers matches the establishment's reported characteristics. That is, we iteratively adjust the worker weights to align the synthetic workforce by the percentage of employees who are: female, age 50 and over, in unions, fulltime workers, low wage and high wage employees. 19 Sheils and Haught (2003) report using a similar raking strategy to form synthetic firms for their analysis of health insurance reforms. Our raking weight adjustment could, in principle, add precision by adjusting for insurance variables including the percent eligible for coverage and the percentages holding single, employee plus one and family plans.
Additional variables, however, increase the chance that raked weights will exhibit considerable variability or that marginal sums will fail to converge to control totals.
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Summary Statistics. By linking the two datasets by establishment characteristics and aligning the synthetic workers using establishment workforce characteristics, we believe that our approach preserves to the maximum extent possible key correlations present in the two MEPS survey components. The resulting database augments the MEPS IC with information on employee characteristics that is representative of each establishment's entire workforce. This information can, in principle, be used to construct means, or other summary statistics, for each establishment for any MEPS-HC employee characteristic. Of course, the quality of any mean estimate for a particular establishment will depend on the strength of the correlation between that variable and the characteristics used in linking the two datasets and in raking the MEPS-HC weights. Regressions using MEPS-HC data confirmed that marginal tax rates are strongly related to many of the variables that we use to construct synthetic workforces.
Summary statistics are generated using the adjusted MEPS-HC weights for workers within each establishment. Summary statistics can be generated for all workers, or subsets of workers. For example, we calculate mean marginal tax rates for all workers and for subgroups of workers defined by insurance variables including eligibility, coverage and plan type: single, employee plus one or family. As we discuss in more detail below, in our estimates of the tax subsidy to employer-sponsored insurance, we adopt the assumption that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions through lower cash wages, with incidence in proportion to the employer's contribution to the employee's held plan. The ability to calculate mean marginal tax rate by type of coverage − single, employee plus one or family -is critical in the implementation of this assumption.
probability of empty, or sparsely populated, cells which decrease the stability of the raking algorithm (Battaglia et. al., 2004) .
Benchmarking-Calibration by Sector. Although the MEPS IC and HC contain similar information on establishments and workforces, there are differences in both the unit of observation (establishment vs individual) and the nature of reporting (e.g., individual's estimate of the number of employees in an establishment vs. human resources knowledge of payroll).
The quality of our linking procedure depends in part on a strong correspondence between MEPS HC and IC data (e.g., evidence that variables are measuring similar concepts). One test of this correspondence is to compare estimates of the total number of workers in the MEPS HC and the MEPS IC overall and by subgroups defined by the variables used in the matching process.
Appendices B1 and B2 present these comparisons for the private and state and local sectors, respectively.
The estimate of the total number of active workers in the private sector in the United 
Estimating the Subsidy to Employer Sponsored Health Insurance
This section describes methods that were first used to estimate the tax subsidy to health insurance for 2006 23 and which we have modified and updated to estimate subsidies for 2008. In the Employer-Sim model, we estimate the tax subsidy to employer-sponsored insurance in terms of the "tax expenditure", or the total dollar amount of foregone revenue. We assume that employer premium contributions are shifted forward to workers in the form of lower cash wages and, therefore, use workers' marginal tax rates to value the subsidy. 24 The per worker subsidy is given in Equation 1:
The need to construct premiums arises for a couple of reasons. First, these models do not have a direct link to the MEPS IC, or another source of premiums. Second, both models simulate changes in insurance coverage resulting from changes in tax policy. This requires information on premiums for held coverage as well as premiums for potential alternative coverage. 23 Selden and Gray (2006) We use MEPS IC-HC linked data to develop tax subsidy estimates for private sector workers and state and local government workers. Federal establishments are out of scope for the MEPS IC, so we develop tax subsidy estimates for the Federal sector using the MEPS-HC distribution of Federal employees combined with the FEHBP premium information described above.
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Estimating tax subsidies requires assumptions regarding how the incidence of employer premium contributions is distributed across workers in a firm. Our approach adopts the widelyused assumption that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions through lower cash wages, with incidence in proportion to the employer's contribution to the employee's held plan. Specifically, we estimate subsidies using enrollment weighted means of premiums for single, employee plus one and family plans and enrollment weighted mean marginal tax rates among employees who hold each type of plan.
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We use IC sample weights to generate tax subsidy estimates that are nationally representative for all active employees in US establishments. All standard errors and statistical tests are adjusted to account for the complex design of the MEPS-IC.
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Results: Tax Subsidy Estimates for 2008.
The total tax subsidy for employer sponsored health insurance for active workers in the U.S. civilian, non-institutionalized population was $214.1 billion in 2008 (Table One) As we discuss above, we believe that our method of linking the MEPS HC and IC preserves, to the greatest extent possible, the correlations between establishments' and workers' characteristics and choices. In Table Three we take advantage of this aspect of our database by examining tax subsidies across groups of private-sector establishments defined by firm size, percent full time workers, wage rate, industry and Census division. For each group we present estimates of the average subsidy per worker − which captures differences in coverage, marginal tax rates and premiums − and average subsidies per covered worker, which focuses attention on differences in marginal tax rates and premiums. We also present information on the percent of workers eligible for coverage, take-up conditional on eligiblity and tax subsidies as a percent of premiums. . Wage Rates. Tax subsidies disproportionately benefit higher-income workers who have higher marginal tax rates, higher coverage rates, and higher premiums. In predominantly highwage establishments, the per worker subsidy is $2,305, and the subsidy per covered worker is $3,176. By contrast, in establishments where more than 50 percent of workers are low-wage, the average subsidy per worker is $677 − less than one-third the level in predominantly high-wage establishments − and the subsidy per covered worker is $2,216. Multivariate results. In Table Four , we use weighted linear regressions to further examine the distribution of tax subsidies in the private sector. The first model (Column 1) examines average subsidies per worker and is weighted by the number of employees in each establishment.
Sector. The first two rows of
Results show that the large differences in average subsidies per worker by firm size, percent full time, wage rate and industry persist in multivariate models and are consistent with our descriptive findings. Differences across Census divisions are somewhat attenuated, but are still statistically significant. The second model (Column 2) examines average subsidies per covered workers and is weighted by the number of employees enrolled in insurance. In general, coefficients in our second model, which examines subsidies per covered worker, are in the same direction, but are smaller than coefficients in our first model, which examines subsidies per worker regardless of coverage. This is not surprising since differences in subsidies per worker reflect differences in eligibility, conditional take-up, benefit generosity and marginal tax rates, while differences in subsidies per covered worker reflect only the latter two factors − benefit generosity and marginal tax rates. Results also suggest, however, that establishments with a higher percentage of eligible employees, tend to offer more generous coverage than establishments with lower percentages of eligible employees.
Limitations. Several important caveats should be considered in evaluating EmployerSim estimates of tax subsidies. First, the model assumes that employer premium contributions are shifted forward to workers in the form of lower cash wages, thereby justifying our use of worker marginal tax rates to value the subsidy. Second, our results may be sensitive to our assumption that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions through lower cash wages, with incidence in proportion to the employer's contribution to the employee's held plan. Future work with Employer-Sim will test the sensitivity of results to alternative incidence assumptions. Third, estimates apply only to active employees. Retiree coverage and self-employment coverage, for individuals in single-person firms, are not included in our model. Fourth, we focus solely on the tax subsidy for employer-provided insurance.
Currently our model estimates do not include tax subsidies on contributions to health savings accounts or on medical expenditures paid through flexible savings accounts. Our estimates also exclude the tax subsidy for deductible medical expenditures in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.
By focusing solely on employment-related coverage of workers, Employer-Sim provides the largest, but not the only piece of the puzzle. 29 It is important to bear in mind that any change in the tax treatment of employment-related health insurance would likely affect these other subsidies. In particular, we do not adjust our estimates for the likely increase in excess medical expense deduction that would occur if the tax subsidy were removed entirely while leaving the existing itemization rules intact. We believe our approach is the appropriate method when studying the magnitude and distribution of the tax subsidy -in contrast to analyzing the budgetary impact of a specific legislative proposal. 
21
we would adjust premiums for single and non single plans to account for premium growth.
Finally, we would use TAXSIM to produce marginal tax rates for the current year.
All data required to project our database to 2011 are currently available. Employment growth factors are available with only a one month lag from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Factors to adjust the percentage of workers with single and non-single coverage and to inflate premiums are currently available from Kaiser/HRET through 2011.
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Alternative Incidence Assumptions. As we discuss above, our basic approach to estimating tax subsidies adopts the widely-used assumption that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions through lower cash wages, with incidence in proportion to the employer's contribution to the employee's held plan. While this simplifies the analysis, many economists subscribe to more nuanced theories of incidence. For instance, it may well be that employees experience cash wage offsets from employer contributions if they are offered coverage -whether or not they take up the coverage offered. Or, it may be that cash wage offsets reflect not only eligibility, but also the likelihood of enrollment. For example, lowwage workers who have low take-up rates might have relatively smaller cash wage offsets.
Incidence might also reflect observable risk factors, such as age, sex, body mass index, and past utilization. Building on Selden and Bernard's (2004) analysis of MEPS HC data, Employer-Sim will enable us to explore the impact of alternative assumptions regarding the incidence of employer contributions on the aggregate tax expenditure and its incidence across subgroups of the population. The ability to model alternative incidence assumptions may also shed insight into the distribution of gains and losses from reforms in this market. 
Changes in Tax Treatment of ESI.
In addition to providing estimates of tax subsidies to employer-sponsored health insurance, under current law, Employer-Sim can also be used to examine the effects of polices that would change the tax treatment of health insurance. A direct extension of our initial modeling work would be to simulate the effect of capping the tax exclusion on tax revenues (and on the tax subsidy). The simplest case would be a "statutory tax incidence analysis" in which we would simulate a change in tax rules, but hold all other establishment and individual behavior constant. Caps on exclusions could, potentially, be formulated in a number of different ways. A cap could be linked to worker pay (as with the payroll tax) so that workers making more than a set threshold would be required to pay taxes on health benefits. Alternatively, a cap could be formulated in terms of the amount of premiums that could be excluded per worker (with separate limits for single, employee plus one, and family plans). The MEPS IC-HC data would provide the flexibility to examine a wide range of subsidy caps.
Tax-Price Elasticities. Employer-Sim may also prove to be a valuable resource for behavioral research into the effect of tax subsidies on the offer and take-up of coverage. The "tax price" of health insurance, which is simply calculated as 1 minus the tax subsidy, formalizes the cost of insurance in terms of (after-tax) consumption of spending a dollar on premiums: 32 See, for instance, Gruber and Poterba (1996a,b) .
One general objective of our research would be to examine establishment and employee behavior as a function of TP, reflecting the widely-held belief among economists that firms' decisions to offer health insurance are based, in part, on the extent to which health insurance is tax preferred for employers and/or their employees. 33 By linking MEPS IC and HC data, Employer-Sim may also offer insights into non-tax-related factors affecting firm decisions, such as (i) the relationship between offering insurance and the percentage of workers with offers from spouses at other companies and/or (ii) the percentage of employees' children who are eligible for public coverage. Finally, TP could be used as a means of evaluating firms' responses to changes in tax-based policies. For example, we would simulate the effects of a subsidy cap on establishments' offers of insurance by first simulating the effect of the subsidy cap on the tax price and then using estimated elasticities of firms' responsiveness to TP to simulate changes in establishments' behavior.
Conclusion
Employer-sponsored insurance will likely continue to be the primary source of health insurance coverage in the United States for nonelderly individuals and families for the foreseeable future. As a result, the cost and incidence of the tax subsidy to employer-sponsored insurance will continue to be a subject of policy debate. The recently passed Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act changes the tax treatment of health insurance in a number of ways including the provision of tax credits to small employers who offer insurance to employees and the imposition of excise taxes on high cost plans.
The central role of ESI and related tax policies in the provision of healthcare in the United States underscores the need for databases that can provide baseline estimates of the cost and incidence of tax subsidies and provide information on the potential implications of reforms.
Unfortunately, no single nationally representative database contains all information necessary to examine tax-based health insurance policies. The Employer-Sim model leverages existing data to construct a unique, high quality database that can be used to examine a broad array of issues related to employer-sponsored insurance. Total compensation (TC) paid by employers for each employee covered by employersponsored health insurance includes wages (W), health insurance premiums (P) and the employer share of Social Security/Medicare, taxes:
t ss ] TC = W[1+ + P (1) In our estimates of the tax subsidy, we assume that employees who hold coverage bear the incidence of employer contributions in the form of lower cash wages. Employers minimize costs by paying benefits in the form of cash wages and premium contributions, per workers' preferences, subject to the constraint that total compensation does not change. This results in a wage-premium tradeoff in which wages fall by less than $1 for each $1 increase in premiums: The change in tax revenues resulting from a change in premiums is: 
The per capita tax subsidy is simply -1 times the expression in Equation 5.
Tax Price:
The "tax price" of health insurance for workers, which formalizes the cost of insurance in terms of the after-tax consumption of spending a dollar on premiums, is equal to 1 minus the tax subsidy, or: 
